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Raising expansion capital by setting connection charges not exceeding a pro rata share
of reasonably anticipated costs of expansion, is permissible where expansion is
reasonably required, if use of the money raised is limited to meeting the costs of expansion. Users
"who benefit especially, not from the maintenance of the system, but by the extension
of the system . . .should bear the cost of that extension."
1
The concept of development exactions 2 for off-site capital facilities, that is,
that new growth and development should pay a fair share of the cost of
facilities needed to serve that growth has, in just a few years, evolved from an
abstract theory3 into a full-blown land use "fad". 4 In Florida, for example,
where land use "fads" find fertile ground, 5 local authorities have been in a
virtual fever to enact and enforce ordinances imposing impact fees for roads,
parks, potable water, libraries, sanitary sewers, solid waste, police, fire, and
emergency services. 6 More than forty local governments have enacted similar
ordinances during the last two years. 7 In such diverse areas as San Francisco,
Boston, and Aspen, developers pay a fee or provide for affordable housing.8
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1. Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 320 (Fla. 1976) (footnote
omitted), reconsidered on appeal from unpublished remand, 358 So. 2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(amended exaction held legal), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979).
2. "Development exactions" is a generic term used in this article to describe an assortment of
techniques employed by local authorities to compel a developer, either by regulation, negotiation, or
simple leverage, to exchange land, money, materials, or services for permission to develop.
3. See, e.g., AMERICAN SOC'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, LOCAL CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS AND
DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT 57-59 (1977).
4. In rough order of their appearance, other notable land use "fads" include planned unit
development, transferable development rights, land use controls, and performance zoning.
5. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 380 (West 1974 & Supp. 1986). For a discussion of Florida's
attempts to guide local decisions relating to growth and development, see Finnell, Saving Paradise:
The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, 6 URB. L. ANN. 103 (1973).
6. E.g., Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n v. Palm Beach County, 446 So. 2d 140, 141 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984)(discussing Palm Beach County's enactment of a comprehensive plan in response
to its "unusual growth rate"); Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 612 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983)(discussing Broward County ordinance enacted to meet needs raised by new subdivision
growth).
7. I have been involved in numerous impact fee programs either as a consultant or as counsel
for a private sector interest and have compiled a substantial library of impact fee ordinances from
around the country including ordinances from, for example, Lincolnshire, Illinois; Palm Beach
County, Florida; Broward County, Florida; Sarasota County, Florida; and San Diego, California.
8. See, e.g., Porter, The Local Regulatory Scene: Overview and Outlook, in DEVELOPMENT REVIEW AND
OuTLOOK, 1984-1985, at 403 (1985).
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Exactions are, in fact, a logical and reasonable response to the cost of sprawl.9
Exactions are not, however, free of drawbacks; their seductive attractiveness
in terms of efficiency and expediency should not be allowed to overshadow
what may be very serious conflicts with well-established planning law
traditions. This article briefly discusses two aspects of those traditions and
suggests several ways in which they conflict with exactions.
Contemporary land use law, albeit subject to much criticism,' 0 is a
reasonably balanced product of careful and effective evolution. " The rigidity
of Euclidean districts has given way to process-secure flexible zoning districts.
Generally, a fair balance has been established between public needs and
private expectations. 12  The evolution of land use controls and the
establishment of a reasonable balance between public and private interests is
the result of two important influences: planning' 3 and due process of law. 14
Because exactions may conflict with the principles of planning and may run




"If American land use controls are to work effectively and fairly, they must be
based upon (a) an overall understanding of the needs for land in the
community, and (b) a sense of direction-that is to say, upon planning."' 5
Simply put, the reasonableness of land use controls depends upon planning
9. For a discussion of the costs of sprawl, see COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE COSTS OF
SPRAWL (1974).
10. See, e.g., R. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS (1977); Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31
SYRACUSE L. REV. 719 (1980); Ziegler, The Twilight of Single-Family Zoning, 3 UCLAJ. ENVTL. L. POL'Y
161 (1982).
11. Much of the criticism leveled at zoning ignores the many practical and effective reforms
accomplished by local authorities throughout the country. Indeed, it has been suggested by Ed
Sullivan, dean of Oregon's planning lawyers, that the critics are out of touch with the current state of
planning law. He believes that many of the concerns rehashed by the critics were long ago solved
with clearly written, flexible ordinances that emphasize specific standards and define development
review procedures. Personal conversation with Ed Sullivan, Partner, Sullivan, Josselson, Roberts,
Johnson & Kloos (Oct. 26, 1985).
12. There are, of course, jurisdictions where the balance is tipped in favor of the public interest.
The mainstream of American planning law, however, is far more reasonable than the critics of the
excesses in California would have the world believe. See generally Porter, On Bemoaning Zoning, URB.
LAND, Mar. 1983, at 34.
13. "Planning," as used in this article, describes a discipline in which a decision maker compiles
information relative to his responsibilities, assesses the information, and then establishes abstract
policies to be applied to individual decisions. As used in this article, planning represents the
antithesis of ad hoc decision making.
14. "Due process of law" refers generally to a range of substantive and procedural principles
that have evolved through the two due process clauses of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. V,
XIV, § 1.
15. 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW § 1.01, at 2 (1974) (emphasis added). Williams
goes on to observe that, "[u]nder a rational system of public action, the basic policy decisions should
be made first on a coordinated basis (planning); and then the appropriate tools (including the various
land use controls) should be selected to carry out these decisions." Id. at 3.
[Vol. 50: No. I
Page 115: Winter 1987]
for coherence, comprehensiveness, and consistency. 16 Otherwise, land use
controls are nothing more than ad hoc exercises of public authority over
private rights in a chaotic and often abusive process.
Unfortunately, planning, although influential in the evolution of
contemporary land use controls, has not lived up to its theoretical promise.
Indeed, many observers conclude that planning has been anything but
successful.17 Nevertheless, the overriding logic of planning as a basis for land
use controls has been a powerful influence in the evolution of land use
controls. In fact, Professor Haar's insightful article, In Accordance with a
Comprehensive Plan,18 served as a powerful force molding the efforts of
contemporary reformers like Babcock' 9 and Sullivan,20 despite the failure of
the American Law Institute's Model Land Development Code to mandate
planning as a prerequisite for zoning.2' Haar said:
It is difficult to see why zoning should not be required, legislatively and judicially, to
justify itself by consonance with a master plan as well. It might even be argued that
any zoning done before a formal master plan has been considered and promulgated is
per se unreasonable, because of failure to consider as a whole the complex
relationships between the various controls which a municipality may seek to exercise
over its inhabitants in furtherance of the general welfare. 22
Although no one would claim that a clear judicial mandate for planning has
been established, even a brief review of the Supreme Court's recent forays
into the land use arena illustrates that planning is now a well-accepted
element of a valid system of land use controls. In Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 23 the Court rejected an attack on New York City's
landmark preservation law in part because "[i]n contrast to discriminatory
zoning, which is the antithesis of land-use control as part of some
16. See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. FEURER & C. SIEMON, THE PERMIT EXPLOSION, COORDINATION
OF THE PROLIFERATION (1976).
17. See, e.g., Siemon & Larsen, In Accordance with the Comprehensive Plan-The Myth Revisited, 1979
INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 105. Alan Jacobs has decried the failure of planning to
mature as a profession and suggested that the profession of planning be abolished and that we start
anew to establish the "profession of Olmstead." Address by Alan Jacobs, Professor of City and
Regional Planning, Annual Meeting of the American Planning Association, Florida Chapter (Nov. 6-
8, 1985). Jacobs, of course, has much to be dissatisfied with, as Babcock and Siemon have observed:
Planning has been scorned, mocked, disparaged, and disdained since the earliest days of land
use regulation. Worse yet, it has been ignored. Oh, there have been millions and millions spent
on planning (most of it lavished on local government by various agencies of the federal
government), but the officially adopted, actually used planning instrument is a rare beast indeed.
It was, for starters, a stepchild of land use regulation, sitting by the hearth while its more robust
sisters, zoning and subdivision controls, were cavorting across the American landscape.
R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED 261 (1985).
18. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955).
19. One of Babcock's principal works reflecting his philosophy on land use is R. BABCOCK & C.
SIEMON, supra note 17.
20. Sullivan discusses some of his views on land use planning in Sullivan & Kressel, Twenty 'ears
After-Renewed Significance of the Comprehensive Plan Requirement, 9 URB. L. ANN. 33 (1975).
21. See MODEL LAND DEV. CODE (1976). Professor Dan Mandelker, another strong advocate of
planning, ably recounts the need for planning in his article, Mandelker, The Role of the Local
Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 899 (1976).
22. Haar, supra note 18, at 1174.
23. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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comprehensive plan, the New York City law embodies a comprehensive plan to
preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest ...."24
Similarly, in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,25 Justice Stevens noted
that "the city's interest in planning and regulating the use of property 26 is a
substantial public interest. More importantly, in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego,2 7 Justice Brennan, a central figure in the Court's decisions regarding
zoning law, 28 criticized San Diego's sign regulations because:
[B]efore deferring to a city's judgment, a court must be convinced that the city is
seriously and comprehensively addressing aesthetic concerns with respect to its
environment. Here, San Diego has failed to demonstrate a comprehensive
coordinated effort in its commercial and industrial areas to address other obvious
contributors to an unattractive environment .... Of course, this is not to say that the
city must address all aesthetic problems at the same time, or none at all. Indeed, from
a planning point of view, attacking the problem incrementally and sequentially may
represent the most sensible solution. On the other hand, if billboards alone are
banned and no further steps are contemplated or likely, the commitment of the city to
improving its physical environment is placed in doubt. By showing a comprehensive
commitment to making its physical environment in commercial and industrial areas more
attractive, and by allowing only narrowly tailored exceptions, if any, San Diego could
demonstrate that its interest in creating an aesthetically pleasing environment is
genuine and substantial. 29
III
DUE PROCESS OF LAw
The other fundamental influence on contemporary planning law with
which exactions may well conflict is due process of law-a group of rights
derived from the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution.30
24. Id. at 132 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court's preference for planning is also evident in
Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). In a
footnote,Justice Douglas complemented the Court's refusal to limit the concept of the public welfare
with a reference to Vermont's land use controls, which, according to Douglas:
direct local boards to develop plans ordering the uses of local land, inter alia, to "create
conditions favorable to transportation, health, safety, civic activities and educational and cultural
opportunities, [and] reduce the wastes of financial and human resources which result from either
excessive congestion or excessive scattering of population.
Id. at 5 n.3 (citation omitted).
25. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
26. Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
27. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
28. See Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring);
San Diego Gas & Elec. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
29. 453 U.S. at 531-33 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV, § 1.
Two hundred years ago, the founding fathers established a government of laws and not of men, in
order to ensure that personal privilege would not supplant the rule of law. As James Madison said:
If they [the ten amendments comprising the Bill of Rights] are incorporated into the
Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of
power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment
upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights.
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 439 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
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Reduced to simple terms, due process of law is a limitation on the manner
in which government exercises power over individual rights and interests. As
Justice Fortas once noted: "Due process of law is the primary and
indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential
term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual and
delimits the powers which the state may exercise." 3i
Notwithstanding the accepted fundamental nature of due process, the
precise meaning of the concept is undefined and has been the subject of
"[m]any controversies." 32 " 'Due process' is an elusive concept. Its exact
boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual
contexts.... [A]s a generalization, it can be said that due process embodies
the differing rules of fair play, which through the years, have become
associated with differing types of proceedings.- 33
Due process requires that governmental powers affecting private rights
and interests be exercised in a fundamentally fair fashion. " 'Due process'
emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the
State .... -34
31. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1967). Justice Harlan has also remarked:
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fundamental than its
erection and enforcement of a system of rules defining the various rights and duties of its
members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitely settle their differences in an
orderly, predictable manner....
American society, of course, bottoms its systematic definition of individual rights and duties,
as well as its machinery for dispute settlement, not on custom or the will of strategically placed
individuals, but on the common law model.... Within this framework, those who wrote our
original Constitution, in the Fifth Amendment, and later those who drafted the Fourteenth
Amendment, recognized the centrality of the concept of due process in the operation of this system.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-75 (1971) (emphasis added).
32. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
33. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). Note also Justice Johnson's characterization of
the due process principle:
[Aifter volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition, the good sense of mankind
has at length settled down to this: that they [the words of due process] were intended to secure
the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the
established principles of private rights and distributive justice.
Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819).
The due process concept evolved from English common law, and was incorporated in the Bill of
Rights. It has continued to find amplification through the fourteenth amendment, legislative
enactments (for example, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-576 (1982)), and
judicial interpretation. Unfortunately, or fortunately, depending on one's perspective on judicial
activism, evolution has not yet produced a precise construction of the due process clause, a
circumstance Justice Black has lamented in several dissents.
The elasticity of that clause necessary to justify this holding is found, I suppose, in the notion
that it [the due process clause] was intended to give this Court unlimited authority to supervise
all assertions of state and federal power to see that they comport with our ideas of what are
'civilized standards of law.'. ..
... This perhaps is in keeping with the idea that the Due Process Clause is a blank sheet of
paper ....
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 393-94 (1971) (Black,J., dissenting) (quoting Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 271-74 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting)).
34. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974).
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This concept of fundamental fairness has shaped modern land use controls
both substantively3 5 and procedurally. The substantive nature of due process
of law in relation to restrictions on land use was discussed by the Supreme
Court in Nectow v. City of Cambridge. 3 6 The Court stated:
[T]he governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general rights
of the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, and other
questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
3 7
This standard has, for fifty years, provided the substantive contours of land
use controls. These contours have developed coincident with the clearly
understood idea that the public welfare is not limited to protection from
offensive and noxious activities and, therefore, the police power itself is broad
enough to respond to the needs of a developing nation.3 8
Substantive due process is alive and well in the planning law context and
provides clear jurisprudential support for Haar's planning thesis. Haar
believes that land use regulations should be enacted pursuant to a
comprehensive plan3 9 because such regulations will bear a substantial
relationship to the public health. 40 In other words, comprehensive planning
ensures existence of a substantial relationship between a particular character,
location, or intensity of a land use and the public health, safety, and welfare.
The policy behind the due process clause is protection of rights through
procedures that are fair. What is fair depends upon a host of factors,
particularly the private rights involved. "Experience teaches . . . that the
affording of procedural safeguards, which by their nature serve to illuminate the
underlying facts, in itself often operates to prevent erroneous decisions on the
merits from occurring." 4 1
Notice to an individual of an impending decision that affects him, receipt
of information upon which the decision is to be made, and the opportunity to
present opposing information and argument are examples of the kind of
safeguards that ensure fundamental fairness. "The assumption is that by
giving parties with sufficient interest in the outcome a chance to present
35. After the era begun by the Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), the Court retreated from judicial scrutiny of the substance of economic regulations. G.
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 462-75 (11th ed. 1985). Zoning law, however, has always and
steadfastly been defined by a substantive requirement that a regulation must provide a minimum
factual basis under the "fairly debatable" standard. For a discussion of this standard, see infra text
accompanying notes 54-57.
36. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
37. Id. at 188 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)).
38. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
39. Haar, supra note 18; see text accompanying notes 18-22.
40. There is a second substantive limitation that arises from the due process clause that is not
directly implicated by exactions, the taking issue. In Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct.
3108 (1985), Justice Blackman rehearsed without endorsing the argument that a regulation that is
overly intrusive is a violation of due process. It is apparent, however, that the lengthy discussion,
together with Justice Stevens' cogent concurrence, id. at 3125 (Stevens, J., concurring), suggests
acceptance of this argument, a position that was also taken by Justice Holmes in Block v. Hirsch, 256
U.S. 135, 156 (1921).
41. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963).
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evidence from their point of view, the government can best make an informed
decision which considers all relevant factors." 42
As the above discussion illustrates, fundamental fairness encompasses a
number of concepts. The first of these concepts is the notion that
governmental decisions should be made on the basis of merit, not on the basis
of personalities or self-interest: "The public has the right to expect its officers
... to make adjudications on the basis of merit. The first step toward insuring
that these expectations are realized is to require adherence to the standards of
due process; absolute and uncontrolled discretion invites abuse."'43 There
must also be an adequate opportunity for affected persons to find out what
information will be used in the decision making process and to offer argument
in rebuttal.
The mere existence of procedural safeguards is not enough to satisfy the
requirements of due process. "A fundamental requirement of due process is
'the opportunity to be heard.' It is an opportunity which must be granted at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 44 A meaningful opportunity
to be heard also requires a realistic opportunity to participate, free of practical
constraints that prevent actual participation. 45
Due process also contemplates equal access and treatment. It "is secured
when the laws operate on all alike, and no one is subjected to partial or
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government." '46 This concept includes
access to processes without regard to economic station. As Justice Black
stated in Griffin v. Illinois: "[s]urely no one would contend that either a state or
the Federal Government could constitutionally provide that defendants
42. Sinaiko, Due Process Rights of Participation in Administrative Rulemaking, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 886,
888 (1975).
43. Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1964). Implicit in the requirement that
decisions be made on the basis of merit is a requirement that decisions be based on all relevant
information. "The hearing required by the Due Process Clause must be 'meaningful' . . . . It is a
proposition which hardly seems to need explication that a hearing which excludes consideration of
an element essential to the decision ... does not meet this standard." Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
541-42 (1970) (citations omitted).
44. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (citations omitted).
45. For example, in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), the Court struck an irrebuttable
statutory presumption that the residence of a university student would always be the location from
where an application was sent "because [the presumption] provides no opportunity for students who
applied from out of state to demonstrate that they have become bona fide Connecticut residents."
Id. at 453.
Similarly, in a case challenging mandatory maternity leave for teachers beginning five months
before the anticipated birth of their children, the Supreme Court struck the regulation and repeated
its dislike for procedures that do not afford individualized consideration of the underlying facts in
each case. It stated:
There is no individualized determination by the teacher's doctor-or the school board's-as to
any particular teacher's ability to continue at her job. The rules contain an irrebuttable
presumption of physical incompetency, and that presumption applies even when the medical
evidence as to an individual woman's physical status might be wholly to the contrary.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Le Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644 (1975).
46. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 603 (1900). Courts have found due process violations in a
number of contexts where procedures affect individuals disparately. "Steadfast adherence to strict
procedural safeguards is our main assurance that there will be equal justice under law." Anti-Fascist
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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unable to pay court costs in advance should be denied the right to plead not
guilty or to defend themselves in court." 47 In addition, he noted that "there
can be no equal justice where the kind of a trial a man gets depends upon the
amount of money he has." 48
Another doctrine that is rooted in the due process clause is the doctrine of
vagueness-the constitutional requirement that a governmental proscription
be explicit enough that affected persons are on notice of those acts or
omissions that will expose them to liability.49 In the absence of defined
standards that are uniformly applied there can be no equal treatment except
by mere coincidence. Governmental power must be confined to the principles
of due process if the salutary goals of the constitutional draftsmen are to be
achieved.
The difficulty with exactions is that they are antithetical to the planning
and due process principles stated above in a number of ways. They are
inherently inconsistent with the established tenets that have defined planning
and due process in the past.
First, exactions conflict with planning and due process principles because
the idea of a fair share "pay as you go" exaction system creates the illusion
that the character, location, and magnitude of land use is simply a matter of a
developer's willingness to pay the cost of new services required by new
growth. Indeed, developers are often vocal supporters of reasonable
exactions because they see them as a means of overcoming local concern
about growth. Given that most growth management controls have been
predicated on the capacity of available public facilities, 50 the developers'
perspective is understandable. The trouble is that the appropriateness of a
particular land use at a particular location depends on far more than the
developer's willingness to pay for needed infrastructure.
The intangible values, community character and quality of life, which lie at
the heart ofJustice Douglas' now often-repeated ode to community character
47. 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (footnotes omitted). In another Supreme Court case, indigent
persons sought access to the divorce courts of Connecticut, but were denied because their indigency
prevented them from being able to pay the filing fees. The Supreme Court struck the provisions and
required the state to develop a procedure that did not disparately bar persons from the courts.
[W]e conclude that the State's refusal to admit these appellants to its courts, the sole means in
Connecticut for obtaining a divorce, must be regarded as the equivalent of denying them an
opportunity to be heard upon their claimed rights to a dissolution of their marriages, and, in the
absence of sufficient countervailing justification for the State's action, a denial of due process.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971) (footnotes omitted). The court noted that the
state had interposed itself into marital relations and by law had provided that marriages could be
dissolved only through judicial process and, having done so, had to make those procedures equally
available to all persons. Id.
48. 351 U.S. at 19.
49. See United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954), where the Court stated that "[t]he
underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could
not reasonably understand to be proscribed."
50. E.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 934 (1976); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138
(1972).
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in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,51 are vulnerable to incompatible or
undesirable land uses whether or not a developer is willing to pay for water,
sewer, or roads. In other words, quality of life involves far more than fiscal
efficiency. It is imperative that land use controls be capable of conserving
community values even if a developer is willing to pay for the cost of needed
improvements. Of course, imposition of an exaction system does not
mandate abandonment of planning programs directed toward maintaining the
community character and quality of life. Nevertheless, some legislators
appear to accept that adoption of an exaction scheme results in abandonment
of this type of program. For example, the Florida Legislature 52 has taken the
view that change is inevitable and that the focus must be on how to
accommodate that change. This position has upset dozens of local authorities
that have comprehensive plans designed to protect important community
values even though greater densities, higher buildings, or more coverage
could be financially accommodated.
The anti-planning implications of exactions go beyond the political
impacts just described. The reason is that quality of life and community
character are concepts that are difficult to quantify and therefore difficult to
reduce to simple regulatory equations, particularly in communities that are
not large enough to support a sophisticated planning department. The
inevitable temptation is simply to abandon the intangibles and to devote
available energies to capital facilities planning-a reactive rather than a
proactive approach to the future.
As troubling as the anti-planning aspect of exactions is, the whole idea that
permission to develop should be dependent on one's willingness to pay raises
an even more odious implication that was long ago rejected as
inappropriate-that zoning is or should be for sale. Most exaction ordinances
contain a schedule of payments purportedly linked to the community needs
occasioned by new growth and development. Most ordinances, however, also
provide for an alternative fee calculation that responds to the imprecision of
impact assessments. As will be shown below, this type of provision is
unfortunate because the calculation is arrived at through negotiation, another
contemporary land use "fad."
In plain terms, under this type of provision, the developer bargains for his
zoning. He may agree to give the community a new road, ambulance, or
whatever, if permitted to build at a higher density. Such a process ignores the
merits of a particular land use at a particular location and focuses instead on
the payment to be received. In other words, a six-lane road may solve the
traffic needs of new growth and development, but it does so at a cost. Growth
for its own sake cannot justify transforming neighborhoods, wetlands, parks,
51. 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
52. The Florida legislature, acknowledging that planning must occur along with population
growth, passed the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation
Act, ch. 85-55, 1985 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 251 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06
(15)(d) (West Supp. 1986)).
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and waterfronts into freeways. Worst of all, the deal made usually depends on
who the deal maker is, rather than what is proposed. This negotiations
process, which is increasingly being used to arrive at decisions relating to land
use,53 exacerbates the risk inherent in exactions. The reason is that
negotiations are uncomprehensive and not standard- or process-oriented;
they rely not on well-conceived policies but on ad hoc agreements that are
usually private. The finely tuned tension between public and private interests,
tempered by citizen involvement and participation, threatens to be replaced
by negotiated deals, the fairness of which depends on the integrity of
individuals in office at any given time.
After years of faithful adherence to the principles of fundamental fairness,
it is difficult to understand why this nation would suddenly find salvation in an
idea that has the potential for abuse and disparate treatment. Of course, the
obvious solution is to eliminate the alternative fee calculation process from
exaction ordinances, which would eliminate the possibility of abuse and
manipulation. The trouble is that the so-called science of exactions is so
imperfect that (understandably) few authorities feel comfortable relying
exclusively upon a rigid preset schedule, which represents a strong
condemnation of the entire concept of exactions. In the abstract, these
concerns are manageable. The limited scrutiny applied to local regulations by
courts, however, makes it difficult to believe that the abuses described will not
flourish and heighten concern about the concept of exactions.
Once it is accepted that it is appropriate for a landowner to pay an
exaction in order to exercise his constitutional property rights, judicial review
of exaction standards is limited to a "fairly debatable" standard 54-what
Judge Goldberg of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit fondly refers to
as the "anything goes" test.55 Simply stated, a regulatory standard has to be
outlandish before a court will intervene, a notion that has assuredly been
confirmed by the Supreme Court's modern polestar of local economic
regulations, New Orleans v. Dukes. 56
Dukes was in fact an equal protection case, but the scope ofjudicial scrutiny
implicit in the fairly debatable standard and the rational basis standard are
virtually identical. The city of New Orleans had passed an ordinance
prohibiting street vendors in the Vieux Carre. The city, solicitous of the
interests of existing vendors (one vendor in particular, reportedly a politically
influential individual), exempted those vendors who had been active in street
vending for more than six years. 57 A hot dog vendor with less than six years
in the streets brought suit challenging the ordinance. The Fifth Circuit
53. See generally MANAGING DEVELOPMENT THROUGH PUBLIC/PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS (R. Levitt &J.
Kirlin eds. 1985).
54. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
55. Arceneax v. Treen, 671 F.2d 128, 137 (5th Cir. 1982) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
56. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
57. A suspicious observer would undoubtedly suggest that the cut-off period had been set at six
years because the politically influential vendor had been in business for seven years. The record,
however, contains no evidence on this point.
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invalidated the ordinance on the ground that it was ludicrous to suggest that
six years of experience selling hot dogs was distinguishable from five years on
the job. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that judicial
scrutiny of essentially economic regulations is limited, and that courts should
not second-guess the judgment of elected officials.
States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their
police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than
mathematical exactitude. Legislatures may implement their program step by step in
such economic areas, adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived
evil and deferring complete elimination of the evil to future regulations. In short, the
judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of
legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights
nor proceed along suspect lines; in the local economic sphere, it is only the invidious
discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently with the
Fourteenth Amendment.
58
The theory adopted in Dukes is an appalling invitation for abuse by local
governments in the context of exactions. Because the judiciary is unwilling to
interfere with economic regulations, municipalities are confident that
developers will find it easier and cheaper to accept exaction fees rather than
challenge the regulations in court.
An example, anonymous because the developer's travails continue,
illustrates the potentially coercive character of the exaction process. The
developer proposed to develop a parcel located at the boundary of a
municipality. The municipality maintains a municipal sewage system that
collects and transmits sewage to a regional wastewater treatment facility
operated by the county. Pursuant to a sewer service agreement, the
municipality collects for the county an impact fee for the fair share of
treatment facility capacity used by each unit of development. Unfortunately
for the developer, the municipality's collection system does not reach his
property. He is therefore obligated to build a sanitary sewer that connects to
another part of the county's system in an adjacent municipality. Worse still,
because of a downstream infiltration problem, the developer is obligated to
contribute an additional $250,000 to the repair of the downstream system.
When he applied for a building permit, he was required to pay an impact fee
that was three and a half times the amount due the county under the sewer
service agreement, even though he had already constructed the sewer main
and contributed $250,000 to support downstream remedial efforts.
The municipality's position is simple: it does not matter whether the fee is
fair-no fee, no building permit. Given that litigation will cost thousands of
dollars and last between nine months and one year (if the municipality does
not appeal), the developer has no choice but to pay the fee. Worst of all, to
some, the municipality's position may seem plausible because the cost levied
against the developer is in fact a pro rata share of the cost of the village's
system. This view, however, overlooks the simple fact that the developer does
58. 427 U.S. at 303-04 (citations omitted).
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not actually use the village's system and is saddled with the fee only because
his property is located within the village.
In other words, the impotency of judicial review exaggerates the potential
for abuse outlined above and explains why it is necessary to adhere strictly to
the principles of fundamental fairness. The abuses inherent in exactions are
inevitable and, in the face of years of experience directed to the fairness of the
planning process, unacceptable.
Regretfully, the anti-planning and due process difficulties do not exhaust
the potential problems with exactions. Implicit in the concept of paying for
the right to develop is the reality that only those who can afford to pay are
permitted to develop-a circumstance that offers a community a clever, but
shameful, means of excluding those of an undesirable character. In fact, in
my opinion, this insidious byproduct of exactions earns it the label as the
latest sheepskin for the wolf of exclusionary zoning.
The impact of public regulation on the cost of housing has been the
subject of extensive treatment, and it takes no significant imagination to
appreciate that a carefully established exaction scheme can keep out
undesirables. Indeed, an impact fee of $5,000 to $10,000 has a significant
impact on the affordability of housing and could ensure that only those of
substantial means locate in a community-all for the seemingly legitimate
purpose of imposing a fair share of the costs on all new development, costs
that are easily manipulated by elected officials through judicious planning.
Consider a community, for example, that imposes a regulatory impact fee for
a wide range of facilities, including many desirable but unnecessary facilities
such as a cultural center or expansive recreation facilities. The pro rata share
of such facilities is $15,000, a fee that is de minimis to the wealthy, but
discriminatory against the less fortunate, not by classification but by effect.
One final aspect of exactions merits brief mention. The Constitution
clearly proscribes the taking of private property for public use without
payment of just compensation, 59 yet exactions amount to such a taking.
Although courts have traditionally validated exaction systems, it is difficult to
understand how a regulation that requires dedication of land or payment of a
fee in lieu thereof does not violate the taking clause. Under an exaction
scheme, private property, land, or money is taken for public use without just
compensation. This paradox goes curiously unresolved.
IV
CONCLUSION
Exactions are a viable means of ensuring that adequate facilities are
available to serve new growth and development. It is imperative, however,
that the draftsmen and public officials who develop such programs clearly
understand that there are great risks inherent in any exaction system and that
careful preparation is necessary to ensure that the system achieves true equity.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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